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Abstract
To comprehend the relationship scheme between human capital accumulation and struc-
tural change observed in developing and developed countries, the paper combines Romer
(1990)s endogenous technological change with Kongsamut, Rebelo and Xie (1997, 2001)s
structural change model and shows that human capital accumulation speeds up structural
change in the early stage of structural change with relatively low human capital while slows
down it in its later stage with relatively high human capital.
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1 Introduction
A relationship scheme between human capital accumulation and the speed of structural change is
observed in the real data. For developing countries, there are positive correlations between human
capital accumulation and the speed of structural change; however, the corresponding correlations
for developed countries are negative. Specically, for each developing country in Table 1, along
with the increase of per capita human capital, the time taken for ten (or so) percentage point
reduction in the employment share of agriculture becomes less and less; on the contrary, for each
developed country in Table 2, even though human capital increases, the time taken for two (or
so) percentate point reduction in the agriculture employment share gets a little bit more. It may
be important to nd a formal model to explain the observed pattern of structural change.
Kongsamut, Rebelo and Xie (1997, 2001, henceforth KRX) develops a three-sector nonbal-
anced growth model to explain the Kuznets facts1 and argues that the reason for structural
change is the di¤erence in the income elasticity of demand for the three nal goods (i.e., agricul-
ture, manufacturing and services). They do not discuss the speed of structural change and human
capital plays no role in their model. Hence the original KRX model cannot explain the observed
pattern about the speed of structural change. For the similar reasons, the supply-side literature
to explain structural change, such as Baumol (1967), Ngai and Pissarides (2007), Acemoglu and
Guerrieri (2008), and Comin, Lashkari and Mestieri (2017), is not qualied for this job either. As
is well known, Romer (1990) examines the growth e¤ect of human capital in a neoclassical growth
model by introducing a research and development sector and monopolistic competition. Therefore,
combining the structural-change model developed by KRX with the endogenous growth model
pioneered by Romer (1990) may have the potential to explain the observed pattern2 of structural
change.
By introducing Romer (1990)s endogenous technological change into the multi-sector growth
model pioneered by KRX, the paper shows that human capital a¤ects the speed of structural
change from two channels: the growth channel and other ones. The aggregate e¤ects are examined
to explain the observed pattern between human capital accumulation and the speed of structural
change. If the stock of human capital is relatively low in the early stage of structural change, an
increase in human capital will speed up structural change greatly. However, if the stock of human
capital is relatively high in the later stage of structural change, then the structural-change e¤ect
of human capital may be negative. A numerical example is also given to develop more intuitions
of the theoretical model.
1The Kuznets facts roughly refer to the massive reallocations of both labor relative weights in GDP from
agriculture into manufacturing and services.
2 In a closely related paper, Growiec, McAdam and Muck (2018) combines the Acemoglu (2003) two-sector model
with the Romer (1990) endogenous technological change model to understand the empirical properties of US labor
income share.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our three-sector structural
change model with endogenous technological changes. Section 3 examines the relationship between
human capital accumulaiton and the dynamics of structural change on the generalized balanced
growth path (GBGP). Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
The production side of the economy consists of three sectors: a nal-goods sector, an intermediate-
goods sector, and a research sector. The nal-goods sector is made up of three subsectors: agri-
culture, manufacturing and services. In each nal-goods subsector, perfectly competitive rms
produce a homogeneous nal good using labor, human capital and all kinds of intermediate goods.
Each subsector utilizes the constant return to scale Cobb-Douglas production function with dif-
ferent technological parameters and factor income shares, namely,
At = BA
 
hAt HY t
  
NAt
 Z t
j=0
 
Ajtxjt
1  
dj; (1)
Mt +

Kt + Kt = BM
 
hMt HY t
  
NMt
 Z t
j=0
 
Mjt xjt
1  
dj; (2)
St = BS
 
hSt HY t
  
NSt
 Z t
j=0
 
Sjtxjt
1  
dj; (3)
where Bi > 0; i 2 fA;M;Sg are three technological parameters; , , (1    ) 2 (0; 1); HY t is
the total amount of human capital used in the nal-goods sector, hit, i 2 fA;M;Sg are the shares
used in these three subsectors,
P
i2fA;M;Sg h
i
t = 1; all of the labor force are employed in the nal-
goods sector and normalized to one, N it , i 2 fA;M;Sg stand for the shares/amounts employed in
the three subsectors,
P
i2fA;M;SgN
i
t = 1; each subsector utilizes all kinds of intermediate-goods in
its production, ijt stands for the demand share of the intermediate-good j 2 [0;t] by subsector
i 2 fA;M;Sg, Pi2fA;M;Sg ijt = 1 for any j 2 [0;t]; the outputs of agriculture (At) and services
(St) can be used for consumption, and the output of manufacturing can be consumed (Mt) or
invested
 
Kt + Kt

, then equations (1), (2), and (3) are also market-clearing conditions for the
three subsectors; the knowledge stock (t) of the economy is determined endogenously by the
amount (Ht) of human capital utilized in the knowledge sector and the current knowledge stock
(t); nally, the prices of the products of the three nal-goods PA, PM , and PS are positive.
The prot-maximization problem of each subsector i will be then discussed. By taking the
price of its product Pit, the wage rates of the labor force and human capital wLt, wHt, and the
prices of all intermediate-goods fpjtg as given, monopolist i 2 fA;M;Sg solves the problem,
max
fN it ;bit;ijt;j2[0:t]g
PiBi
 
hitHY t
  
N it
 Z t
j=0
 
ijtxjt
1  
dj wLtN it wHthitHY t 
Z t
j=0
pjt
i
jtxjtdj:
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The FOCs with respect to N it , h
i
t, and 
i
jt are as follows
PiBi
 
hitHY t


 
N it
 1 Z t
j=0
 
ijtxjt
1  
dj = wNt; (4)
PiBi
 
hitHY t
 1  
N it
 Z t
j=0
 
ijtxjt
1  
dj = wHt; (5)
PiBi
 
hitHY t
  
N it

(1    )  ijtxjt   = pjt: (6)
The rst two optimality conditions show that the marginal product values of labor force and
human capital equal the wage rates of them in each subsector i. The third one displays that
the equality between marginal revenue and marginal cost for any intermediate good j in each
subsector i, which are also the (inverse) demand functions for any intermediate good j in each
subsector i.
Knowledges are designs for the intermediate goods. Being created and granted a patent, a piece
of knowledge can be used to produce a kind of intermediate good. The types of these intermediate
goods are determined by the knowledge stock created by the research sector. Hence the amount
of the types of intermediate-goods is essentially the knowledge stock t. Any kind of intermediate
good is produced by a single monopolistic rm. The decision process of any monopolistic rm
can be separated into two steps: rst, he pays the price P jt to buy the patent for producing
intermediate good j in the competitive patents market, which is the sunk cost for the monopolistic
rm. Since the patents market is competitive, the price of new design j is the present value of
the prots ow fjg1=t generated by monopolistic rm j, P jt =
R1
=t exp
   R s=tRsdsjd .
Second, in the monopoly pricing problem, monopolistic rm j rents capital (as variable costs) and
produces intermediate goods j to satisfy the demand of the nal-goods sector for its products. It
is assumed that the unit cost for any intermediate good is the same  (> 0) units of capital. Then
the prot-maximization problem of any monopolistic rm j can be summerized as:3
jt = max
pjt;xjt
pjtxjt  Rtxjt: (7)
Optimization yields us the symmetric monopolistic pricing formula
pjt =
1
1    Rt  pt: (8)
Note that Rt is the marginal cost for producing additional unit of intermediate good, and
1= (1    ) (> 1) is the mark-up over marginal cost. In order to earn the monopoly prot,
all monopolistic rms price their products over their marginal costs. Moreover, all monopolistic
rms set the same monopoly price and hence earns the same monopoly prot.
3Note that the gross interest rate equals the net interest rate plus the depreciation rate, i.e., Rt = rt + . It is
assumed that the monopoly rm bears the depreciation cost.
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Since all production factors (capital, labor and all intermediate goods) of the nal-goods sector
are freely mobile, by utilizing the symmetric property of the prot-maximization problem of the
intermediate-goods sector, we can derive the e¢ ciency condition of production,
NAt = h
A
t = 
A
t ; N
M
t = h
M
t = 
M
t ; N
S
t = h
S
t = 
S
t ; (9)
which display that the optimal weights of labor, human capital and all intermediate goods em-
ployed in each subsector of the nal-goods sector are equal. Furthermore, if we set PM = 1 in
equilibrium, then the (relative) prices of agriculture and services are constant, namely,
PA =
BM
BA
; PS =
BM
BS
: (10)
The research sector uses human capital Ht and the existing stock of knowledge t to produce
new knowledge, with the following knowledge production function

t = Htt; (11)
where  (> 0) is the productivity parameter. The knowledge production function shows that
devoting more human capital to research leads to a higher production rate of new designs, and
the larger the total stock of designs is, the higher the productivity of the researchers employed
in the research sector will be. Due to its partially excludability and nonrivalry of consumption,
the production of knowledge cannot be determined by the private maximizing behavior. The
evolution of knowledge however follows the trajectory described by equation (11). In the paper,
knowledge refers to designs for new intermediate goods. Then the accumulation of knowledge
represents the increase of the types of intermediate goods.
Since human capital is freely mobile, no arbitrage requires it has the same rate of return among
the research sector and three subsectors in the nal-goods sector, namely,
Ptt = PiBiHY t
 1tx
1  
t ; i 2 fA;M;Sg : (12)
The representative consumer makes consumption and asset accumulation decisions in order
to maximize the discounted utility of consumption stream for three nal goods, namely,
max
fAt;Mt;St;Kt+1g
(Z 1
t=0
e t
 
At  A
u  
Mt +M
v  
St + S
w1    1
1   dt
)
; (13)
subject to the ow budget constraint (FBC):

Kt = wHtH + wNt +RtKt   BM
BA
At  Mt   BM
BS
St; (14)
where  2 (0; 1) is the subjective time preference rate;  2 (0;+1) is the constant coe¢ cient
of relative risk aversion; A (> 0) is the level of subsistence consumption, M (> 0) and S (> 0)
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represent home production of manufacturing and services; u; v; w 2 (0; 1) stand for the relative
utility weights of consumption for agriculture, manufacturing and servies, satisfying u+v+w = 1.
Solving the utility-maximizing problem gives us the consumption Euler equation

Mt +M
Mt +M
0@= At  A
At  A
=

St + S
St + S
1A = 1

(Rt   ) : (15)
3 Human Capital and Structural Change on the GBGP
Since all intermediate-good rms are monopoly rms, the decentralized equilibrium of the multi-
sector economy is a monopolistic competitive equilibrium, which is determined by (1)-(6), (8),
(9), (11), (12), (14), (15) and the initial and transversality conditions. A generalized balanced
growth path (GBGP) is dened as a trajectory along which the real interest rate is a constant,
R. Imposing the knife-edge condition
A
BA
=
M
BM
+
S
BS
; (16)
we solve the stationary equilibrium as follows:
H =
H   
 (1 + )
; (17)
R =
H + 
 + 1
; (18)
g =
H   
 + 1
; (19)
where   = (+ ) (1    ). Equation (19) shows that the rate of economic growth depends
on the total stock of human capital, time discount rate, and technological parameters of the re-
search and nal-goods sectors. The larger the total stock of human capital in the economy is, the
more the human capital employed in the research sector becomes (@H=@H = 1= ( + 1) > 0),
the faster knowledge accumulates (@g=@H = = ( + 1) > 0). Hence the rate of economic
growth will be higher (@g=@H = = ( + 1) > 0).
On the GBGP, using (1), (2), (3), (15), (19), and (16), we obtain the dynamic equations for
the employment shares of the three nal goods

NAt =  g
A
BAHY x1  t
=   g

0 exp (gt)
A
BA
1
HY x1  
< 0; (20)

NMt = g
 M
BMHY x1  t
=
g
0 exp (gt)
M
BM
1
HY x1  
> 0; (21)

NSt = g
 S
BSHY x1  t
=
g
0 exp (gt)
S
BS
1
HY x1  
> 0: (22)
Hence we have the following
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Theorem 1 A generalized balanced growth path (GBGP) with a constant equilibrium interest rate
(18) and a constant equilibrium endogenous growth rate (19) exists whenever the knife-edge
condition (16) holds. On the GBGP, as is implied by equations (20), (21), and (22), the
employment and production shares decline in agriculture, rise in both manufacturing and
services.4
Theorem 1 shows that on the GBGP if technology changes and hence the economy grows
endogenously, because the demand elasticity of income for agriculture is less than one and the de-
mand elasticities for both manufacturing and services are larger than one, along with the growth
of the economy, even though all the three nal goods expand, the speeds of expansion for both
manufacturing and services are larger than the one for agriculture, then the employment and pro-
duction shares of agriculture decrease gradually, the ones for manufacturing and services increase
correspondingly. Labor forces in the economy transfer from agriculture to both manufacturing
and services, which displays that the industry structure upgrades gradually.
Corollary 1 If H ! (=)+, @

 

NAt

=@H and @

N it=@H; i 2 fM;Sg approach very large
positive numbers for any nite t; if the parameter values satisfy H 2


 ;
(1+)
(1 )

,  2
(0; 1), and t > tc  1+
h
1 
+
1
H+= +
(1=+)=
(H =)(H+=)
i
, then

 

NAt

=@H < 0, and
@

N it=@H < 0; i 2 fM;Sg.
From equations (20), (21), and (22), we can decompose the e¤ects on structural changes of
human capital into two di¤erent parts. The rst part (g= (0 exp (gt))) is through economic
growth. Since the term g= (0 exp (gt)) is not a monotone function about g, even though the
equilibrium growth rate g is increasing with respect to human capital H, i.e., @g=@H > 0,
we are not sure of its e¤ects on structural change. However, if there exist no innovations and
growths, namely, g = 0, even though the demand elasticities among the three nal goods are
di¤erent, the industrial structure will not change, i.e.,

N it = 0; i 2 fA;M;Sg. Therefore, economic
growth can be thought of as the fundamental driving force for structural change. The second part 
1=HY x
1   also displays ambiguous structural-change e¤ect of human capital through other
channels than growth. To examine the aggregate e¤ects of human capital accumulation on the
speed of structural change, we take the partial derivatives w.r.t H on both sides of (20), (21), and
(22):
4We generalize the model to the case with di¤erent labor income shares and intermediate-good input shares
among agrigulture, manufacturing and services. The derivations can be found in the online appendix or available
upon request.
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@
 

NAt

@H
=

 

NAt

| {z }
>0

1
H   (=)  

 + 1
t+
1  2  
+ 
1
H + (=)

; (23)
@

N it
@H
=

N it|{z}
>0

1
H   (=)  

 + 1
t+
1  2  
+ 
1
H + (=)

; i = M;S: (24)
If the stock of human capital approaches = from the right, i.e., H ! (=)+, @

 

NAt

=@H
and @

N it=@H approach very large positive numbers for any nite t. That is to say, if the stock
of human capital is relatively low, an increase of human capital will speed up structural changes
greatly. This case may correspond to the observed pattern for developing countries in Table
1. For these countries with relatively low human capital, the structural-change e¤ect of human
capital accumulation is very large. On the other hand, we make the same assumptions of H 2

 ;
(1+)
(1 )

and  2 (0; 1) as Romer (1990)5 to guarantee both positive equilibrium growth rates
and nite objectives. Then, if t > tc, then both @

 

NAt

=@H and @

N it=@H are negative, which
shows that if the time t is so long that the process of structural change is almost completed and
the stock of human capital is relatively high, the structural-change e¤ect of human capital may be
negative. For those developed countries with relatively high level of human capital, even though
human capital still increases, there is very few space for structural change and the marginal
contributions of human capital accumulation may be negative.
A numerical exercise makes the above results more clearly. Let A = 1, A0 = 2, BA = 4,  = 1,
 = 0:3,  = 0:3,  = 0:8, 0 = 1, S = 0:5, S0 = 0:5, BS = 2:5. The stock of human capital in
the economy is taken to be 0:2, 0:4, and 0:8, respectively. It is shown in Figures 1, 2 and 3 that
(1) with higher level of human capital, the absolute values of the slopes for the employment (and
production) shares of the three subsectors are larger in the rst 20 periods, which displays that
an increase of the stock of human capital speeds up structural change greatly; (2) on the contrary,
in the last 20 periods, the absolute values of these slopes become smaller, which shows that the
structural-change e¤ect of human capital accumulation is negative.
Due to (21) and (22), we have the following
Corollary 2 If the model parameters satisfy MBM >
S
BS
, then the expansion of manufacturing
is quicker than services; if the model parameters satisfy MBM <
S
BS
, then the expansion
of manufacturing is slower than services; If MBM =
S
BS
, then the expansion speeds of both
manufacturing and services are the same.
5The two assumptions on H and  are implicitly made in Romer (1990).
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4 Conclusion
By introducing Romer (1990)s endogenous technological change into the multi-sector growth
model pioneered by KRX, the paper shows that human capital a¤ects the speed of structural
change from two channels: the growth channel and other ones. The aggregate e¤ects are examined
to explain the observed pattern in the data. If the stock of human capital is relatively low in
the early stage of structural change, an increase in human capital accumulation will speed up
structural change greatly. However, if the stock of human capital is relatively high in the later
stage of structural change, then the structural-change e¤ect of human capital may be negative.
The combined model is helpful to comprehend the observed relationship scheme observed in
developing and developed countries.
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5 Online Appendix (Not for Publication)
5.1 Derive the Production E¢ ciency Conditions
Substituting the demand functions for the intermediate good j into the objective function of the
monopolistic problem yields us
jt = max
xjt
PiBi
 
bitHY t
  
N it

(1    )  ijtxjt   xjt  Rtxjt:
The necessary conditions w.r.t xjt are
Rt = PiBi
 
bitHY t
  
N it

(1    )2  ijtxjt   ; i 2 fA;M;Sg : (25)
Combining the demand functions for intermediate goods and (25) yields us the monopoly pricing
formula in the text. Due to (25), the demand functions for intermediate goods, and the monopoly
price, we know that
n
ijtxjt : i 2 fA;M;Sg
o
do not depend on j, that is, the optimal demand for
each intermediate good is the same among the three subsectors. Since Ajtxjt+
M
jt xjt+
S
jtxjt = xjt
does not depend on j, i.e., xjt = xt,
n
ijt : i 2 fA;M;Sg
o
do not depend on j either. That is,
these three subsectors in nal-goods sector use the same share of each intermediate good, namely,
Ajt = 
A
t ; 
M
jt = 
M
t ; 
S
jt = 
S
t : (26)
Furthermore, each monopoly rm earns the same monopoly prot, namely,
jt = (+ ) ptxt = t; j 2 [0;t] : (27)
Combining the two marginal productivity conditions for both labor and human capital leads
to one e¢ ciency condition in production:
hAt
NAt
=
hMt
NMt
=
hSt
NSt
= 1; (28)
which displays that at optimum each subsector in the nal-goods sector utilizes the same weights
for both labor and human capital. Combining the same two equations as above leads to another
e¢ ciency condition in production:
At
NAt
=
Mt
NMt
=
St
NSt
= 1; (29)
which shows that at optimum each subsector in the nal-goods sector uses the same weights for
both all intermediate goods and labor. Combining (28) and (29) yields the e¢ ciency conditions
for production
NAt = h
A
t = 
A
t ; N
M
t = h
M
t = 
M
t ; N
S
t = h
S
t = 
S
t : (30)
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5.2 Derive the Euler Equation and the MCE
The representative consumer makes consumption and asset accumulation decisions in order to
maximize the discounted utility of consumption stream for three nal goods, namely,
max
fAt;Mt;St;Kt+1g
(Z 1
t=0
e t
 
At  A
u  
Mt +M
v  
St + S
w1    1
1   dt
)
; (31)
subject to the ow budget constraint (FBC):
PAAt + PM

Mt +

Kt

+ PSSt = wHtH + wNt +RtKt; (32)
and the initial asset stock K0. Substituting PA = BM=BA; PS = BM=BS and the denition
PM = 1 into (32) we obtain the FBC

Kt = wHtH + wNt +RtKt   BM
BA
At  Mt   BM
BS
St: (33)
Constructing the Hamiltonian
H ()  e t
 
At  A
u  
Mt +M
v  
St + S
w1    1
1   +t

wHtH + wNt +RtKt   BM
BA
At  Mt   BM
BS
St

;
where t is the present-value Hamilton multiplier. The rst order necessary conditions are
e t
 
At  A
u  
Mt +M
v  
St + S
w 
u
 
At  A
u 1  
Mt +M
v  
St + S
w
= t
BM
BA
; (34)
e t
 
At  A
u  
Mt +M
v  
St + S
w   
At  A
u
v
 
Mt +M
v 1  
St + S
w
= t; (35)
e t
 
At  A
u  
Mt +M
v  
St + S
w   
At  A
u  
Mt +M
v
w
 
St + S
w 1
= t
BM
BS
; (36)
tRt =  

t; (37)

Kt = wHtH + wNt +RtKt   BM
BA
At  Mt   BM
BS
St; (38)
together with the initial condition K0 and the transversality condition limt!1 tKt = 0.
From equations (34), (35), and (36), we know that
u
v
Mt +M
At  A
=
BM
BA
;
w
v
Mt +M
St + S
=
BM
BS
: (39)
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Rearranging terms of equation (35), taking time derivative on both sides, and using (39) lead
to
   

Mt +M
Mt +M
=

t
t
: (40)
Combining (37) and (40) gives us the Euler equation in the text

Mt +M
Mt +M
0@= At  A
At  A
=

St + S
St + S
1A = 1

(Rt   ) : (41)
The monopolistic competitive equilibrium is described by the following
Theorem A monopolistic competitive equibrium of the multi-sector economy is composed of
equilibrium price sequences

PA; PM ; PS ;

pjt; P
j
t

j2[0;t]
; wHt; wLt; Rt

and allocation se-
quences
n
At;Mt; St; HY t; Ht; N
A
t ; N
M
t ; N
S
t ; 
A
t ; 
M
t ; 
S
t ; (xjt)j2[0;t]
o
, satisfying: (1) The
representative consumer consumes and accumulates physical capital to maximize the objec-
tive function (31), subject to the FBC (32); (2) In the nal-goods sector, given its production
technology, each subsector chooses labor, human capital and all of the intermediate goods to
maximize its prots; (3) Given the demand for its products, any intermediate-good monopoly
rm j 2 [0;t] chooses monopoly price pjt to maximize its monopoly prot jt; (4) The
research sector uses human capital Ht and the existing knowledge stock t to develop new
knowledge with the technology

t = Htt; (5) The markets for three nal goods clear;
(6) Labor market clears, i.e., NAt + N
M
t + N
S
t = 1; (7) The market for human captial
clears, i.e.,
 
hAt + h
M
t + h
S
t

HY t +Ht = HY t +Ht = H; (8) Capital market clears, i.e.,
Kt =
R t
j=0 xjtdj; (9) Any patent market clears.
5.3 Calculate the Growth Rate and Equilibrium Shares on the GBGP
Utilizing the demand functions for intermediate goods, the monopoly pricing formula, and the
capital market clearing condition, we derive the intereat rate as
Rt = (1    )2 + 1BMHY t

Kt
Tt
+
: (42)
Setting Rt = R and using (41), we have

Mt +M
Mt +M
=

At  A
At  A
=

St + S
St + S
=
1

(R   )  g; (43)
where g  1 (r   ) is dened as the growth rate of At   A, Mt + M , and St + S on GBGP.
Since (Kt=Tt) is constant on GBGP, Kt =
R t
j=0 xjtdj and xjt = xt, we know that xt = Kt= (t)
is constant, i.e., xt = x. From the market-clearing condition of human capital and (42), we
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know that human capital employed both in the nal-goods and research sectors are constant
on GBGP, i.e., HY t = HY , Ht = H

. On the GBGP, we know that P

 = 
=R, and
P  = PMBM (=)H
 1
Y x
1  . Combining the two equations with the demand functions
of intermediate goods, the monopoly pricing formula, and (27) yields
HY =
R
 (+ ) (1    ) ; H

 = H  
R
 (+ ) (1    ) : (44)
From the knowledge accumulation equation, we know that both knowledge stock and physical
capital grow at the same rate, namely,
g = g

K = g
 = H   R

(+ ) (1    ) : (45)
Since all endogenous variables grow at the same rate on GBGP, we have
1

(R   ) = H   R

(+ ) (1    ) : (46)
Solving (45) and (46) for R and g gives us
R =
H + 
 + 1
; g =
H   
 + 1
: (47)
Combining the optimal monopoly price, (44), and (47), we obtain the equilibrium output of any
intermediate good
x =

BM




 1 (1    )2R 1
 1
+
: (48)
Substituting (30) into the production functions the nal-goods sector, we know that the em-
ployment shares of labor force in the three subsectors, on the GBGP, are
NAt =
At
BAHY x1  t
; NMt = 1 

At
BA
+
St
BS

1
HY x1  t
; NSt =
St
BSHY x1  t
:
(49)
Taking the time derivatives on both sides of these three equations leads to the change rates of the
labor employment shares of agricuture, manufacturing and services

NAt =  g
A
BAHY x1  t
=   g

0 exp (gt)
A
BA
1
HY x1  
< 0; (50)

NMt = g
 M
BMHY x1  t
=
g
0 exp (gt)
M
BM
1
HY x1  
> 0; (51)

NSt = g
 S
BSHY x1  t
=
g
0 exp (gt)
S
BS
1
HY x1  
> 0: (52)
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The production shares of the three subsector are dened as
i =
PiBi
 
hitHY t
  
N it
 R t
j=0

ijtxjt
1  
djP
k2fA;M;Sg PkBk
 
hktHY t
  
Nkt
 R t
j=0

kjtxjt
1  
dj
; i 2 fA;M;Sg :
Substituting (30) and the relative prices into the above equations, we know that the labor em-
ployment shares equals the corresponding production shares in these three subsectors, namely,
N it = i; i 2 fA;M;Sg :
Then we derive the comparative statics of an increase in human capital. Substituting (44),
(47) and (48) into (50)-(52) leads to

NAt =  c01g exp ( gt)R
1 2 
+ ;

NMt = c02g
 exp ( gt)R 1 2 + ;

NMt = c03g
 exp ( gt)R 1 2 + ;
where
c01 =
A
0BA
(=) 
h
BM (=)
  1 (1    )2
i((+ 1)=(+))
;
c02 =
M
0BM
(=) 
h
BM (=)
  1 (1    )2
i((+ 1)=(+))
;
c03 =
S
0BS
(=) 
h
BM (=)
  1 (1    )2
i((+ 1)=(+))
:
Taking the partial derivatives on both sides of the above equations w.r.t H and arranging terms,
we have
@

 

NAt

@H
=

 

NAt

1
H   (=)  

 + 1
t+
1  2  
+ 
1
H + (=)

; (53)
@

NMt
@H
=

NMt

1
H   (=)  

 + 1
t+
1  2  
+ 
1
H + (=)

; (54)
@

NMt
@H
=

NSt

1
H   (=)  

 + 1
t+
1  2  
+ 
1
H + (=)

: (55)
If H ! (=)+, @

 

NAt

=@H and @

N it=@H approach very large positive numbers. To
avoid the innity of the objective function on the GBGP, we impose the assumption
  (1  ) g =   (1  ) H   
 + 1
> 0: (56)
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If  2 (1;+1), then it is satised by itself. If  2 (0; 1), then it is equivalent to H <
 (1 + ) = (1  )

=  ( + 1) = (1  ) + = > 

. Then ifH 2 (=;  (1 + ) = (1  )),
then 
1
H   (=)  

 + 1
t+
1  2  
+ 
1
H + (=)

> 0 (57)
is equivalent to
t >
1 + 


1  
+ 
1
H + =
+
 (1= + ) =
(H   =) (H + =)

 tc: (58)
5.4 Derive the Generalized Model with Di¤erent Factor Income Shares
We generalize the benchmark model to include di¤erent factor income shares in the three subsec-
tors (agriculture, manufacturing and services) of the nal-goods sector. The production technol-
ogy of the nal-goods sector is changed as follows:
At = BA
 
hAt HY t
A  
NAt
A Z t
j=0
 
Ajtxjt
1 A A
dj  YAt; (59)
Mt +

Kt + Kt = BM
 
hMt HY t
M  
NMt
M Z t
j=0
 
Mjt xjt
1 M M
dj  YMt; (60)
St = BS
 
hSt HY t
S  
NSt
S Z t
j=0
 
Sjtxjt
1 S S
dj  YSt: (61)
The prot-maximizing problem of each subsector i yields the following necessary conditions:
PiBii
 
hitHY t
i 1  N it i Z t
j=0
 
ijtxjt
1 i i dj = wHt; (62)
PiBi
 
hitHY t
i i  N it i 1 Z t
j=0
 
ijtxjt
1 i i dj = wNt; (63)
PiBi
 
hitHY t
i  N it i (1  i   i)  ijtxjt i i = pjt: (64)
The monopoly pricing problem for each intermediate good j gives us the monopolistic pricing
formula
pjt =
1
1  i   iRt; i 2 fA;M;Sg ; (65)
which implies that the income shares of all intermediate goods employed in each subsector are
the same, i.e.,
1  i   i  ; (66)
and all monopoly rms set the same price, i.e.,
pjt = pt: (67)
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Combining (64) and (67), we know that the optimal products of all intermediate goods are equal,
xjt = xt; (68)
and each subsector i of the nal-goods sector utilizes the same shares of all intermediate goods,
ijt = 
i
t: (69)
The research sector is the same as before. The consumers utility maximization problem gives
rise to the same Euler equation

Mt +M
Mt +M
0@= At  A
At  A
=

St + S
St + S
1A = 1

(Rt   ) : (70)
Dene
1
qt
 
A
N it
it
;
1
Qt
 i
i
N it
hit
; i 2 fA;M;Sg : (71)
Then we have that
1
Qt
=
X
i
i
i
N it =
M
M
 

M
M
  A
A

NAt  

M
M
  S
S

NSt ; (72)
1
qt
=
X
i

i
N it =

M
 


M
  
A

NAt  


M
  
S

NSt (73)
To nd the GBGP, by setting Rt = R and utilizing (65)-(67) and (70), we know that p =
R= and
 
Mt +M

=
 
Mt +M

= 1 (R
   )  g. Combining (64), (67)-(69), and (71) gives
us
p = PiBi

i
i
QtHY t
i  
i
qtxt
 1
; i 2 fA;M;Sg : (74)
Substituting (62), (63), and (71) into the ow budget constraint of the representative consumer,
we obtain the following dynamic equation

Kt = BMM

M
M
QtHY t
M 1 
M
qtxt

tH +BM

M
M
QtHY t
M
M


M
qtxt

t
+RtKt   PA
 
At  A
   Mt +M  PS  St + S+   PAA+M + PSS :
We conjecture that if Pit = P i ; i 2 fA;M;Sg are constant and the equality  P AA+M+P SS = 0
holds on the GBGP, then each term on the both sides of the above equation expands at the same
rate g. Due to (74), we have
0 = i
0@ Qt
Qt
+

HY t
HY t
1A+ (   1) qt
qt
+

xt
xt
!
; (75)
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QtHY t = c04 (qtxt)
1 
i ; (76)
where
c04 =
264 p
PiBi

i
i
i  
i
 1
375
1
i
:
Combining (75) and (76) yields us

Qt
Qt
+

HY t
HY t
=

qt
qt
+

xt
xt
= 0; (77)
which also displays that both QtHY t and qtxt are constant on the GBGP. Substituting (71) into
(62) and then into no arbitrage condition Ptt = wHt leads to
Pt =
p
c04
(xtqt)
1  1 
M ;
which tells that Pt is constant on the GBGP, i.e., Pt = P . Then 
 = RP  = (1  ) px.
Hence xt = x and qt = q. Using (72) and (73), we know that
1
Qt
+
1
qt
+ 1 =
X
i
N it
i
=
1

1
qt
; (78)
which shows that Qt = Q and hence HY t = HY , Ht = H  HY = H. By the knowledge accu-
mulation equation

t = Htt, we know that g = H

 on the GBGP. Combining (62), (74),
RP  = (1  ) px, and Ptt = wHt, we have that HY = R

 

;where 
  q= (1  )Q.
Then g = H

 = H   
R. Since g = 1 (R   )  g, we know that
R =
H + 
1 + 

; g =
H   

1 + 

: (79)
Then it is easy to derive the dynamic equations of the employment shares of agriculture,
manufacturing and services on the GBGP, namely,

NAt =  g
A
BA

M
M
QHY
M  
M
qx

t
=   g

0 exp (gt)
A
BA
1
A
A
QHY
A  
A
qx
 < 0;
(80)

NMt = g
 M
BM

M
M
QHY
M  
M
qx

t
=
g
0 exp (gt)
M
BM
1
M
M
QHY
M  
M
qx
 > 0;
(81)

NSt = g
 A
BS

S
S
QHY
S  
S
qx

t
=   g

0 exp (gt)
A
BS
1
S
S
QHY
S  
S
qx
 > 0:
(82)
16
Furthermore, the production shares of the three subsectors in the nal-goods sector are not equal
to their corresponding employment shares. Their production shares equal the same optimal input
of each intermediate good in each subsector, namely,
#i =
q
A
NAt = 
i
t: (83)
If the factor income shares are the same in the three subsectors, i.e., A = M = S and
A = M = S , then the above equilibrium results degenerate to the ones in the text.
To check our conjecture, we only need to solve the constant equilibrium prices P i ; i 2
fA;M;Sg on the GBGP. Substituting (80), (81), and (82) into

NAt +

NMt +

NSt = 0 and us-
ing (63) lead to
 P AAA +MM + P SSS = 0: (84)
Now we solve the algebraic equations composed by  P AA + M + P SS = 0 and (84) for P A and
P S . Since A 6= S (otherwise, the model degenerates to the original model with the same factor
income shares), they can be solved as
P A =
M   S
A   S
M
A
;P S =
M   A
A   S
M
S
: (85)
If the parameters satisfy S < A < M or M < A < S , then they are positive.
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Figure 1: Human Capital and Employment in the Agricultural Sector
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Figure 2: Human Capital and Employment in the Manufacturing Sector
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Figure 3: Human Capital and Employment in the Services Sector
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Table 1 
 
Declining Employment Shares and Average Years of Schooling for 5 Developing Countries. 
Country Declining Shares  Years Years of Schooling 
China 
0.69-0.60 10 5.1 
0.59-0.50 11 6.7 
0.49-0.40 4 7.7 
Thailand 
0.79-0.72 14 4.2 
0.68-0.60 13 5.3 
0.60-0.50 6 6.5 
India 
0.72-0.70 24 3.1 
0.69-0.60 14 4.4 
0.59-0.54 10 5.7 
Kenya 
0.80-0.70 22 3.6 
0.69-0.61 4 6.1 
0.59-0.50 10 6.8 
Indonesia 
0.72-0.70 24 4.6 
0.69-0.60 14 6.5 
0.59-0.54 10 8.0 
Source: Wittgenstein Centre for Demography and Global Human Capital (2015);   
GGDC 10-Sector Database for sectoral employment data. 
 
Table 2 
Declining Employment Shares and Average Years of Schooling for 6 Developed Countries. 
Country Declining Shares Years Years of Schooling 
Denmark 
0.106-0.081 8 10.9  
0.079-0.060 9 11.4  
0.059-0.039 11 11.8  
0.038-0.027 13 12.2  
France 
0.138-0.115 3 7.2  
0.108-0.086 6 8.2  
0.083-0.061 8 9.0  
0.058-0.038 12 10.1  
Italy 
0.125-0.101 3 8.0  
0.100-0.080 4 8.6  
0.080-0.060 6 9.2  
0.057-0.037 15 10.2  
Sweden 
0.080-0.063 6 9.9  
0.063-0.042 12 10.8  
0.042-0.022 23 12.3  
Japan 
0.164-0.141 4 10.0  
0.139-0.118 4 10.6  
0.115-0.094 6 11.3  
0.090-0.071 6 12.0  
0.068-0.049 14 12.8  
Korea 
0.170-0.150 2 10.1  
0.140-0.117 2 10.9  
0.112-0.093 6 11.7  
0.089-0.069 7 12.5  
Source: Wittgenstein Centre for Demography and Global Human Capital (2015);   
GGDC 10-Sector Database for sectoral employment data. 
